This article deals with international norms influencing foreign policy of a state. It looks at the extent to which the OSCE human rights norms influence foreign policy. It also presents the results of a questionnaire survey carried out in Turkey. As far as the types of norms are concerned, the OSCE human rights norms have been divided into substantive and non-substantive norms. The following conceptual hypothesis has been constructed: nonsubstantive human rights provisions of the OSCE documents have more influence than substantive ones on foreign policy with a human rights objective. The research has shown that the OSCE human rights norms guide the decision-making process of foreign policy with a human rights objective. It has also shown that non-substantive human rights provisions of the OSCE documents guide the decision-making process of foreign policy with a human rights objective more than substantive human rights provisions. It is, hovvever, important to note the fact that Turkey has human rights problems, and is in the way of becoming Europeanised, has affected the extent of guidance of the OSCE human rights norms in foreign policy.
Introduction
This article is about intemational lavv or norms factor influencing foreign policy of a state. Although there are also political, social, and economic factors, the intemational lavv and relations has a signifıcant place in a study about the environmental factors influencing foreign policy or the behaviour of states. Studies in this area have been conducted from different perspectives including behavioural, policy sciences, functionalist, and case study. Ali perspectives except behavioural one are concerned vvith studying intemational lavv in its political and social settings including perceptions, interests, values, and objectives of participants in the intemational arena as vvell as the impact of such variables on the nature and character of lavv and its development.
This study follovvs behavioural perspective, vvhich is mainly concerned vvith the relationship betvveen intemational lavv and national behaviour. In this context, the article has endeavours to resolve vvhether there exists a contingent relationship betvveen the OSCE 1 human rights norms and foreign policy of individual member states. The related terms have been defıned in the specific project and methodology section belovv. As far as the types of norms are concerned, the OSCE human rights norms have been divided into substantive human rights norms and non-sukstantıve human rights norms, so that the resolution of the identifıed problem can be facilitated by the split of such norms. They could have been separated as ' The OSCE stands for the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe. It was formerly the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe until the Budapest Summit held in 1994. The change in name became effective on 1 January 1995. The OSCE is a relatively new phenomenon: its approach is co-operative and programmatic rather than a treaty based one. It is based on the implementation of the intemational standards rather than standard setting. Its procedure for dealing vvith violations of human rights is based on the Human Dimension Mechanism. Hovvever, its documents, from 1975 Helsinki Final Act to 1999 İstanbul Charter for European Security, includes many substantive human rights norms as well as nonsubstantive ones. Although the İstanbul Charter has not put forvvard any norms for the Human Dimension Mechanism, it has for the fırst time made the commitments of the participating states about the promotion of the development of independent judicial systems.
substantive and procedural rights norms according to the usual separation of rights in the literatüre. However, it seems more reasonable to make the division in the former way because the defınition of non-substantive human rights provisions, on the one hand, do not exclude procedural norms, whilst on the other hand, include various human rights principles not falling into either substantive or procedural human rights norms. Such separation is also useful and necessary for the examination of the practical application of such documents, 2 and the perception of functions of human rights norms on foreign policy. 3 Although there exists a contingent relationship between the types of norms and the types of situations in international relations, which has been reviewed in the literatüre section, few have been directly concerned vvith such a relationship. It is thus necessary to do research on this issue to make an assessment of the role of norms in international life. Moreover, analytical tools on the behaviour of states, and thus theories of international relations, cannot be developed unless this area is studied.
The Literatüre
In the literatüre, factors influencing foreign policy or the behaviour of states are well studied. With regard to the cognitive process, vvhich is viewed as an integral aspect of the decision-making process, the vvorks by, among others, M. G. Hermann, S. Chan, and A. L. George analysed individual personality characteristics, roles, belief systems, and situational factors. With regard to the legal or normative factor, M. S. McDougal has used the policy science perspective. 12 Such perspective provides an assessment of the effectiveness of international law in both factual events in international processes and the important role of the national decision-maker in the foreign policy decision making and implementation processes. In addition, the functionalist perspective, used by Corbett, Stone, Friedman, and Jenks in the study of international law, presents the idea that the effectiveness of international law could be improved and its domain extended if the development and study of law and the attainment of non-political goals in the international system or the satisfaction of certain socio-economic needs were closely correlated. Further, the case study perspective, used mainly by B. 15 In such an approach, "the intemational system" can be regarded as the fundamental concept by vvhich the systemic data relevant to the role of intemational lavv in vvorld affairs could be organised, and the future role of intemational lavv could be predicted on the basis of such data. Since then, the vvorks of various scholars have shovvn the usefulness of the systems-approach as an analytical tool in the understanding of the lavv-politics relationship. In this respect, S. Hoffman has applied it to intemational lavv in the context of historical sociology and attempted to correlate the conflictive patterns of the past vvith the prevailing social structures operating in the intemational society to ascertain the place of intemational lavv in politics. 16 Faik and Mendlovitz, on the other hand, have looked into future intemational conflicts and the present social structures to appraise empirically the vvork of lavv in the present and near future. 17 Their studies vvere based on the data that should be organised to emphasise the prospects of lavv in the present and immediate future.
The communication approach vvas also used by Coplin to explain that intemational lavv is regarded as an important instrument of communication, including diplomacy. 18 Starr further sees such a communication fimction as a precondition for the facilitative function, "as the set of expectations to be communicated includes the rules necessary for the simple co-ordination of behaviour required to get things done". 19 As intemational lavv has the co-ordinating function in the search for solutions to common problems, methods of ^M. A. Kaplan, and N. de communication research in the social sciences can be used for the fiınctions of international lavv.
As there is the contingent relationship betvveen the types of norms and situations, it is vvorth examining such types. As far as the norms types are concerned, various types are seen in the literatüre. One of them is the legal and non-legal norms type. Although the coercive characters of the attached sanctions or the logical pedigree vvithin a legal system are, as Kratochvvill explains, 20 regarded as the distinguishing characteristics of legal prescriptions from non-legal norms, there is not a clear demarcation criterion of lavv because of the ambiguity of the concept of lavv. On the other hand, if one makes social order dependent upon lavv, s/he understands the international arena largely negatively, i.e., in terms of the "lack" of binding legal norms, of central institutions, of a sovereign vvill, ete. In addition, there are some norm-types that do not clearly fail into the traditional conceptualisations of lavv; such as the thinking of "soft lavv", an example of vvhich is the OSCE documents.
Although there iş not a clear demarcation criterion of legal norms from non-legal ones, in the vievv of Cohen, the shared feature of the regulatory principles (including general norms of behaviour, aspects of international lavv and rules that are created by formal and informal understanding or are contained in the "spirit" of agreements, verbal gentlemen's agreements and tacit agreements) is that they guide the conduct of states in their relations vvith each other.
21 Thereby, they prevent or, at least, mitigate conflict and facilitate co-operation. Although there are differences in scope, formulation, generality and solemnity betvveen such rules, they are looked upon as a single genus. Thus, the results of their infringements can be described as uniform. Such rules are called rules of the game. The function of rules of the game for international society is like that of norms in domestic society. They shovv the limits on permissible conduct, thereby permitting conflict to be contained, and act as guidelines for desirable behaviour, thereby facilitating active co-operation. Moreover, as the concept of "rules of the game" is wider than law, provisions of international law are not excluded.
Besides, Kratochwill maintains that norms have three generic functions.
22 First, they are guidance devices that are designed to simplify choices and convey "rationality" to situations by dravving the factors that a decision-maker has to take into account. Here, they have functions to reduce the complexity of the choice-situations in vvhich the actors fmd themselves. Secondly, they are the means that allovv people to pursue goals, share meanings, communicate vvith each other, criticise assertions, and justify actions. Finally, they are also influential to the processes of deliberation and interpretation because norms influence choices through the reasoning process. More importantly, norms play roles not only in the international but also domestic arena. Hence, lavv is seen a matter of "degree" of influence that various norms have upon decision making.
Again according to Kratochvvill, 23 practice-type norms and precepts are regarded as the norm types that are designed to overcome the disjunction betvveen the individually and collectively desirable state of affairs. Whereas the former usually concern performances and thus specify the conditions under vvhich a given action shall be held valid, the latter are prescriptions of the highest generality that try to overcome the dilemmas betvveen self-interest and socially desirable actions.
Norms are also categorised as tacit or explicit norms. The emergence of the former is derived from the mutual expectations of tvvo actors. Such rules are based on the situations in vvhich each actor vvorks out for his/her beliefs about the world. The latter are formulated in cases in vvhich a common history or culture are not shared by the interacting parties; tacit rules are imprecise; there exists a deadlock among various equilibrium points and thus the emergence of a settled practice cannot be avvaited; the solution is likely to engender further debate. Moreover, directives, customary norms, and rights are counted ^Kratochvvill, Rules, Norms and Decisions, p. 10 as co-ordination norms resolving the co-ordination and interference problems.
24
As far as foreign policy, defıned as the type of situation is concerned, given the view of Luard about foreign policy and human rights, 25 foreign policy decisions are about: fırstly, keeping human rights on the international agenda; secondly, the improvement of the human rights norms (standard-setting); thirdly, the improvement of the human rights mechanism; and lastly, the direct influence on other governments. In essence, they are made unilaterally, and where such behaviour should be displayed in particular circumstances.
Furthermore, situations, in which foreign policy decisions with a human rights objective are made, are not ones that claims and counterclaims are made tovvards vvhether fundamental human rights are violated or not. This is the case even if when making decisions with direct influence on other governments. Such decisions are either based on the assumption that human rights in a country concerned are violated, or have demanding characteristics tovvards receiving information about the human rights situation in the country concerned. In these situations, presumably, norms with the general character, and procedural norms help and guide decision-makers primarıly in moulding their decisions.
The Specific Project and Methodology
The aim of this research is to determine the extent of the influence of the human rights norms of the OSCE documents have on member states' foreign policies. More specifıcally, it aims to establish vvhether or not non-substantive human rights provisions of the OSCE documents have more influence than substantive human rights provisions on foreign policy with a human rights objective. Even in the instance vvhere there is a relative lack of research in the area, ıt is possible to project a conceptual hypothesis as follovvs: Non-substantive 24 Ibid.,p. 81. human rights provisions of the OSCE documents have more influence than substantive ones on foreign policy with a human rights objective.
As far as the defınition of the terms are concerned, nonsubstantive human rights provisions of the OSCE Documents are defıned as norms that are not directly concerned vvith fundamental human rights themselves. Rather, they may be called precepts that are prescriptions of the highest generality. They include general principles and procedural rules. Hence, they have a general character and had a significant place in the formation of the rights system of the OSCE. As far as the term of foreign policy is concerned, the aspect of the decision-making process of foreign policy with a human rights objective has been selected. The reason for this is the assumption that the study of foreign policy involves its environment as vvell as the process, the decisions and their implementation. According to Snyder, the environmental perspective is very much a decision making 26 Helsinki Final Act ofAugust 1, 1975 , 14 ILM 1292 27 Vienna Concluding Document of January 15, 1989 , 28ILM(1989 531. November 21, 1990 , 30 ILM(1991 approach to the study of foreign policy. 29 The term of decision-making process of foreign policy with a human rights objective has also been operationally defmed as to include; decisions of a foreign minister (FM) about foreign policy vvith a human rights objective, advice of bureaucrats to the FM to give a decision on foreign policy vvith a human rights objective, comments of senior editors of nevvspapers about foreign policy vvith a human rights objective, and declarations of leaders and deputy leaders of opposition political parties about foreign policy vvith a human rights objective. Legislative body and interest groups are excluded from the operational definition of the term. The reason is that the involvement of the former in the decision-making is very limited in parliamentary democracies, and the impact of the latter on the decision-making is extremely limited even in democratic polities because they have no authoritative position in the foreign policy process.
^Charter of Paris for a New Europe of
The conceptual hypothesis has thus been reformulated as 4 subhypotheses and 40 operational hypotheses. Sub-hypotheses are as follovvs:
1. Non-substantive human rights provisions of the OSCE documents have more influence than substantive human rights provisions on the decisions of a foreign minister about foreign policy vvith a human rights objective.
2. Non-substantive human rights provisions of the OSCE documents have more influence than substantive human rights provisions on the advice of bureaucrats to a foreign minister upon foreign policy vvith a human rights objective.
3. Non-substantive human rights provisions of the OSCE documents have more influence than substantive human rights provisions on the declarations of leaders and deputy leaders of opposition parties about foreign policy vvith a human rights objective. 4. Non-substantive human rights provisions of the OSCE documents have more influence than substantive human rights provisions on the comments of senior editors of newspapers upon foreign policy with a human rights objective.
The data was collected, by using a questionnaire survey conducted in the period February-April 1995 in Turkey from the elites, such as the Foreign Minister (FM); 11 bureaucrats, 16 leaders and deputy leaders of opposition political parties, 10 senior editors of nevvspapers. In the questionnaire, a 30-item nominal scale (Yes=l, No=2) was used to measure whether the respondents vvere involved in the decision-making process of foreign policy with a human rights objective. Moreover, a 60-item ordinal scale (Ali the time=5, Often=4, Sometimes=3, Rarely=2, Never=l) was used to measure the extent of the influence (guidance) of substantive and non-substantive human rights provisions of the OSCE documents on the decision-making process of foreign policy vvith a human rights objective. Of the 38, 16 questionnaire forms including that of the Foreign Minister (FM) M vvere not returned; the 22 vvere returned, giving an average response rate of 58 per cent.
Descriptive (frequency, mean) and inferential statistics (Pearson's Chi-square, t test) vvere used in analysing the fındings. The .10 level of signifıcance vvas selected so that the null hypothesis is to be rejected if the sample outcome is among the results that vvould have occurred no more than 10 per cent of the time. The Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) for WINDOWS Release 6.0 programme vvas used for the computer analysis.
The majör assumptions underlying the study, particularly those on vvhich the hypotheses are based, are as follovvs: actors who are involved in the decision-making process in foreign policy vvith a human rights objective are identifıable, and conceive a given country as one in vvhich there exists fundamental human rights violations or problems. Elites responses vvere sought on the assumption that they vvould be avvare, and therefore the rest of the population, of the links betvveen the variables. Being elites, it is also assumed that they themselves might have some influence on the behaviour of the state. Moreover, foreign policy decisions vvith a human rights objective are not concerned vvith crisis situations. The importance of this assumption lies in the fact that, during a crisis situation, actors are limited to those such as prime minister, interior and foreign ministers, and so on. As far as behaviour is concerned, it is observable, measurable, and characterised by the involvement of actors in various decision-making situations. The influence of norms is measurable according to the time sequence. In a mail survey, non-response is a refiısal unless informed othenvise.
The Findings and Discussion
Generally, guidance levels of the OSCE human rights norms occurred as expected in the decision making process of foreign policy with a human rights objective: The guidance frequency distributions of non-substantive human rights provisions (NSHRPs) and substantive human rights provisions (SHRPs) clustered tovvards the high and low ends respectively on the advice of bureaucrats to the Foreign Minister (ABFM), declarations of leaders and deputy leaders of opposition parties (DLDOP), comments of senior editors of nevvspapers (CSEN). The mean guidance values of non-substantive human rights provisions were higher than that of substantive human rights provisions on the ABFM, DLDOP, and CSEN (see Table) . Hovvever, unexpectedly, the mean guidance value (4.600) of the provision of respect for human rights (1975 HFA) was not higher than that of the right of the individual to know and act upon his rights (1975 Helsinki Final Act) (4.800) on the CSEN upon the declaration ın the OSCE meetings that the government has respect for human rights. As far as the relationship between the guidance levels of the OSCE human rights norms in the decision-making process of foreign policy vvith a human rights objective is concerned, the data shovvs that regarding:
• The ABFM; the 10 pairs of variables could be independent because the chi-square values lead to acceptance of the null hypotheses.
• The DLDOP; of the 10 pairs of variables, only 3 could not be independent because their chi-square values lead to rejection of the null hypotheses; 7 could be independent because their chi-square values lead to acceptance of the null hypotheses.
• The CSEN; of the 10 pairs of variables, 5 could not be independent because their chi-square values lead to rejection of the null hypotheses; 4 could be independent because their chi-square values lead to acceptance of the null hypotheses; 1 pair of variables cannot be examined because the number of non-empty rovvs or columns is one. Consequently, vvhere the pairs of variables could be independent, the guidance levels of substantive human rights provisions vvere not determined by that of non-substantive human rights provisions on the decision-making process. Where the pairs of variables could not be independent, the guidance levels of substantive human rights provisions vvere determined by that of non-substantive human rights provisions on the decision-making process.
As far as the differences betvveen the mean values of variables are concerned, of the 10 pairs of variables about the ABFM, the mean guidance values of non-substantive human rights provisions vvere statistically higher in the 6 pairs of variables than that of substantive human rights provisions, vvhilst, in the 4 pairs of variables, the mean guidance values of non-substantive human rights provisions vvere not statistically higher than that of substantive human rights provisions. Of the 10 pairs of variables about the DLDOP, in the 7 pairs of variables, the mean guidance values of non-substantive human rights provisions vvere statistically higher than that of substantive human rights provisions, vvhilst, in the 3 pairs of variables, the mean guidance values of non-substantive human rights provisions vvere not statistically higher than that of substantive human rights provisions. In each of the 10 pairs of variables about the CSEN, the mean guidance values of nonsubstantive human rights provisions vvere not statistically higher than that of substantive human rights provisions. Of these, 1 pair of variables vvas also not as expected.
In the light of the fmdings, conclusions about the operational hypotheses are made as follovvs: of the 40 operational hypotheses, 30 vvere tested by using chi-square and t tests, and 10 vvere not tested because the questionnaire format vvere not responded to by the Foreign Minister. Ali the tested operational hypotheses except one vvere supported as being in the expected direction. Of these, 13 vvere statistically signifıcant, and 17 vvere not. The results shovv that of the 30 operational hypotheses tested, 13 vvere supported and 17 vvere not supported statistically at the .10 level. 2 of the operational hypotheses supported vvere confırmed by the chi-square test results.
The fındings from the fıeldvvork vvere then presented to knovvledgeable people of senior political and administrative status in Turkey, vvith a vievv to explore further explanatory variables. Regarding vvhy the OSCE human rights norms guided or vvere considered in the decision-making process in foreign policy vvith a human rights objective, applied experts vvere responded as follovvs:
• Işık 30 suggested that Turkey had an established, active and experienced bureaucracy in foreign policy: 'When foreign policy decisions vvith a human rights objective are made, ali the international documents and commitments of Turkey are considered.' Moreover, everything in foreign policy including persons, verbal or vvritten agreements, ete. forms the vievv of international relations. The aim of a contemporary, independent, modern state is to shovv that it is not aeting against international relations. Hovvever, he vvas doubtful about the extent that media and opposition political parties influence the government because they approach matters superfıcially. They refer to norms to strengthen their messages. 30 Interview vvith Rüçhan Işık, Director of ILO Ankara Office, 8/7/ 1996, 11:20-12 :00.
• Özge 31 argued that in foreign policy the OSCE human rights and the related norms are used as a means, not goals. Thus, when foreign policy decisions are taken towards human rights, provisions of agreements are not used as a framevvork, or not considered in such decision-making situations. Even when considered, vvhich are only 5%, such norms are considered as having ethical, not legal, character. Moreover, the OSCE norms are important in the vvay of democratisation because "democracy" has a signifıcant place in the OSCE process.
• Karaosmanoğlu 32 argued that the OSCE documents are political rather than legal instruments. Hovvever, they are, to a signifıcant extent, legally binding from the perspective of customary international lavv. Thus the follovving explanations can be made: fırstly, states generally consider international lavv rules despite the existence of some exceptions. Such rules are consequently considered in foreign policy decision-making process as vvell. Secondly, Turkey has traditional diplomacy in complying vvith international lavv: vvhen explaining its foreign policy, it feels the need to make reference to international lavv. He also argued that that Turkey has a European vocation in the form of the fact that "you are European but you should perform some obligations to be able to become more Europeanised". As a result of such a vocation, Turkey sees OSCE documents as instruments vvhich their obligations should be fulfilled in the process of becoming Europeanised.
• Doğan 33 asserted that fırst of ali, they are vvritten documents made for the purpose of the achievement of security. Secondly, they comprise of common values: human beings consider values like this during history. Thirdly, individuals might consider such norms for various reasons such as legal, political, and ethical, in foreign policy. Lastly, Turkey's membership of the OSCE might lead to consideration of such documents and norms. Relations, Bilkent University, 9/7/1996, 11:10-12:00. 33 Interview vvith Lütfı Doğan, MP, Welfare Party, 3/7/1996, 17:20-18:10. • Bağcı 34 argued that although the OSCE documents and norms do not have universal legal values, and their standardisation has not been fınished, they are instruments with regional legal values but not above the constitutional law, in which their fulfılment is desired.
• Şafak 35 claimed that the OSCE documents are important instruments in the protection of human rights because such documents arrived at with consensus are useftıl for humanity. Besides, they have priority över national constitutional instruments. They also reflect a more objective result for human rights issues because mankind carry their cultures into such documents.
• Tan 36 claims that in Turkey everybody, i.e. politicians, lawyers, and scientists, has the duty of becoming contemporary and vvesternised. It is thus necessary to have some criterion. The OSCE, in this sense, has the revised documents for becoming Europeanised. Besides, it provides Turkey, ın appearance, with a framework that it acts according to such norms. Moreover, OSCE documents and norms help Turkey's pragmatism in the Customs Union entered into with Europe. From the point of view of foreign policy, it also provides the image that Turkish people are not behind Europeans, and have become contemporary and comply with such norms because ali European countries signed them.
• Ensaroğlu 37 put the two reasons for the consideration of the OSCE norms: fırst, even if they are not legally binding, they are "agreements" and have legal elements, thus, states consider such norms in the area of foreign policy. Secondly, the fact that they are kept on the agenda because of recent documents might lead to their consideration in some decision-making situations including foreign policy. 34 Interview with Hüseyin Bağcı, Associate Professor, Department of International Relations, Middle East Technical University, 4/7/1996, 10:00-10:45. 35 Interview with Ali Şafak, Professor Dr., Poliçe Academy, 28/6/1996, 14:40-15:50. 36 Interview with Ahmet Tan, MP, Democratic Left Party, 25/6/1996, 14:00-14:45. 37 Interview with Yılmaz Ensaroğlu, General Director of Mazlum-Der, Ankara, 3/7/1996, 10:15-11:55. • According to Özer, 38 on the one hand, such norms vvere considered because of the outcome of globalisation, vvhilst on the other hand, he believed that in the area of human rights there is a huge gap betvveen the arrangement of the OSCE and the situation of Turkey. This is because some rights are, as it is believed, restricted due to the combat against terrorism. In Turkey, referring to and considering such norms in foreign policy fiil such a gap.
• Birdal 39 argued that this issue has tvvo dimensions: firstly, NGOs and lavvyers consider OSCE human rights norms, partly, because of the universality of human rights, and partly, because of being party to such agreements having legal values; secondly, the state considers such norms because of the legıtımisation of its acts, e.g. the application to the Council of Europe and other intemational institutions, causing the double-standards.
• İnan, 40 hovvever, argued that he does not believe that the OSCE human rights norms are considered in foreign policy. Firstly, human rights concept is related vvith the economic level; in other vvords, it vvould not be the uniformity of criterion in the area of human rights; and secondly, the OSCE has lost its function. Moreover, the OSCE norms are confused vvith that of the Council of Europe.
Regarding the reasons vvhy non-substantive human rights provisions of the OSCE documents guided or vvere considered more than substantive human rights provisions in decision making process of foreign policy vvith a human rights objective, follovving opinions vvere offered:
Işık argued that in foreign policy, political approach is related vvith more abstract things, vvhile Özge claimed that in foreign policy, norms having a general character are referred to or considered because decision makers are not involved in specific matters, and not in a position of proving, and think that general norms or expressions 3^I nterview vvith Yalçın Özer, Senior Editör, Turkish Daily Nevvspaper, 4/7/1996, 17:15-18:15. 3^I nterview vvith Akın Birdal, General Director of Human Rights Association, Ankara, 4/7/1996, 17:30-18:30. 40 Interview vvith Kamran İnan, MP, Motherland Party, 25/6/1996, 13:30-14:10. include specifıc or subordinate ones. According to Karaosmanoğlu and Tan, substantive norms have a specifıc character. Thus, in foreign policy, norms with a specifıc character have a risk of putting decisionmakers or the state in a diffıcult position. Thus they refer to or consider human rights norms with a general character. According to Şafak, on the other hand, the Turkish foreign policy reflects its society, vvhich has considered important "procedural issues", since the tanzimat, vvhich brings together double standards. Birdal argued that non-substantive norms are important for the state. Politicians consider or refer to such norms in their decision-making situations to save appearances leading to concrete situations being overlooked. Ensaroğlu said that norms with general character or procedural norms are able to be used easily in foreign policy because such norms are ambiguous, and thus, do not hold obligations.
As far as the generalisability of the fındıngs is concerned, it is necessary to consider both the statistical and qualitative views as follovvs:
Even though ali but one of the fındings vvere in the expected direction, some results vvere not statistically signifıcant, so that some operational hypotheses vvere not supported. It is unlikely that failure for statistical support of some operational hypotheses vvas the result of a faulty theoretical framevvork, because it is vvell established and there is suffıcient evidence from previous research about the impact of norms on behaviour of states mentioned in the preceding sections. It could be that either the sample size or the poor response rate has contributed to the uncertainty of fındings in this area.
Hovvever, from a qualitative point of vievv, given that such operational hypotheses vvere supported on the basis of the data, the follovving arguments vvere made:
Özer claimed that such results could be generalised because they appeared plausıble, vvhile Karaosmanoğlu and Tan asserted that the fındings relating the concept of foreign policy might not be generalised because dıfferent results might be expected according the research methodology. Bırdal agreed vvith the generalisatıon of the fındings because of the different fiınctions of substantive and non-substantive human rights norms in the area of foreign policy, vvhile Bağcı agrees vvith the generalisation of the results because of the fact that no one vvould claim that we do not consider such norms. But İnan disagreed vvith the generalisation of such fındings because he claims that 95% of Turkish people and 50% of MPs do not knovv of the OSCE.
As far as the fındings are concerned, they were the same as and supported those of Kaplan and Katzenbach, Hofmann, Faik and Mendlovitz, Coplin, and Kegley and Raymond, in that both the existing fındings and those of other researchers vvere about the behavioural perspective vvith different approaches studying the relationship betvveen international lavv and national behaviour. 41 Hovvever, the fındings of McDougal, Corbet, and Faik, were about different perspectives studying international lavv in its political and social settings. 42 The fındings also support those of Kratochvvill 43 because they shovved that norms had generic functions and that lavv can be seen a matter of degree of influence of such norms upon decision-making. Moreover, the fındings supported the idea of: Schachter 44 that the HFA is not outside the basic rule of pacta sunt servanda, and that the participating states are not free to act as if there vvere no such instruments; Kiss and Dominick 45 that participants' acceptance that the individual has a right to knovv and act upon his rights is a contribution of fundamental importance to the defınition and implementation of human rights; Cohen 46 that non-binding vvritten agreements vvere, at least, politically binding, and of paramount importance because they are considered in policy making and in many decision-making situations. 
Conclusions
The research has shown that the OSCE human rights norms guide the decision-making process of foreign policy vvith a human rights objective. It has also shovvn that non-substantive human rights provisions of the OSCE documents guide the decision-making process of foreign policy vvith a human rights objective more than substantive human rights provisions. This demonstrates that generally, environmental factors influence foreign policy, and that specifıcally, "intemational human rights norms", even legally non-binding, is seen as the specifıc aspect of such environmental factors. Not only human rights norms of the OSCE, but also that of Council of Europe (CE) are bound to have some influence on foreign policy of a state.
The split of the human rights norms into non-substantive and substantive has proven useful for analytical purpose, and has also shovvn that norms vvith different characteristics have influenced foreign policy of a state as an intemational actor in different vvays. It has thus made a contribution to the body of knovvledge as it offers a nevv normative model for the analysis and conceptualisation of human rights norms in the behaviour of a state.
The influence of human rights norms in the OSCE is beyond the generic functions of norms. They influence foreign policy of states for the follovving reasons: fırst, they are means, vvhich provide legal and political advantages to the country concerned. In other vvords, consideration of such norms provides a country, in appearance, vvith a framevvork that it acts according to such norms; serves for a country's pragmatism; plays a sıgnifıcant role in the vvay of becoming Europeanised; and provides the image that people of the country concerned are not behind the European people. Generally, such reasons seem to be valid for countries that have not completed their development. Secondly, a legal condition of a country is a reason for the influence of such norms on the behaviour of states. For instance, a country in vvhich fundamental rights are not quaranteed fiılly in its domestic lavv applies such norms. Lastly, they have legal, political, ethical, and cultural values. Why norms vvith different characteristics have a different influence on foreign policy of states lies in the nature of "lavv" and "polities".
